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Book Reviews 
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY by John 
Agresto. * Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press (1984) 
192 pp. $7.95. 
Reviewed by Neal E. Devins** 
The judicial branch is the clear focus of constitutional decision-
making; national debate regarding abortion, busing, school prayer, 
and the rights of the criminally accused generally fastens on the 
Supreme Court's decisions. Concerned that "[t]oday citizens, 
members of Congress and presidents alike look to the courts for 
all constitutional deliberation - that is, for all decisions involving 
the deepest questions of national direction,"1 John Agresto em-
phasizes the need for the executive and Congress to check the ju-
diciary and to develop constitutional law by interpreting the 
Constitution independently. Agresta's work, The Supreme Court 
and Constitutional Democracy, offers a new perspective on the 
ongoing debate over constitutional interpretation and the role of 
the Supreme Court in American government. 
Part I of this Review describes Agresta's theory of "constitu-
tional" government and its impact on our conception of judicial 
review. Part II assesses the viability of that theory. 
* Deputy Chairman, National Endowment for the Humanities. 
** Assistant General Counsel, United States Commission on Civil Rights, Wash-
ington, D.C. The views expressed are those of the author. The author would like to 
thank Louis Fisher and Ron Gross for their thoughtful comments on an earlier draft 
of this review. 
1. J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 11 
(1984). 
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L Agresto 's Theory of Constitutional Government 
Congress and the executive are undoubtedly authorized to in-
terpret the Constitution.2 Congress's repeated passage (and the 
executive's repeated signing) of child-labor laws, in the face of 
contrary rulings by the Court, is but one example of independent 
constitutional interpretation by the elected branches.3 Neverthe-
less, scholars addressing the role of the Supreme Court in Ameri-
can government rarely view constitutional interpretation as the 
interplay between the Court and the other branches of 
government.4 
Unlike the spate of recent works on judicial review,5 The 
Supreme Court and Constitutional Democracy is concerned with 
the relationship of Congress and of the executive to the Supreme 
Court. For Agresto, 
[C]onstitutional government implies that the ultimate inter-
preter of our fundamental law is not an autonomous judiciary 
but the interactive understanding of the people, their 
representatives, and their judges together. We should see the 
American political system not as a pyramid, with the Court at 
the top as the ultimate authority, but rather as an interlocking 
2. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974); Fisher, Constitutional 
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. REv. 707, 747 (1985). 
3. See J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 27-31. After invalidating child-labor legisla-
tion in 1918, see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918), and again in 1922, 
Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 44 (1922), the Supreme Court upheld Con-
gress's third child-labor statute as a legitimate exercise of its Commerce Clause 
power, United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 121 (1941). See J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, 
at 29-31. 
4. Scholars merely have compared institutions' capacities for making and imple-
menting social policy. See, e.g., D. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 298 
(1977) (concluding that the judicial process is ill-suited to consider competing interests 
and institute social reform); M. REBELL & A. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICY MAKING 
AND THE COURTS at xi (1982) (proposing that courts, in view of separation of powers 
and their fact-finding capabilities, are adept at making policy decisions on education 
issues); Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy for Con-
stitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 366 (1984) (suggesting that when con-
fronted with constitutional issues the Court should compare the various 
governmental institutions' abilities to deal with a particular issue and, on the basis of 
that comparison, choose the best decisionmaker from among them). 
5. In recent years, major works by prominent scholars and jurists have offered 
conflicting views of the appropriateness, scope, and effect of judicial review. 
Although great differences exist within this body of scholarship, these varying inqui-
ries serve the limited purpose of justifying or of undermining judicial review without 
addressing the ongoing dialogue between the branches. See, e.g., R. BERGER, GoVERN-
MENT BY JUDICIARY 407-48 (1977) (suggesting that the Court's expansive decisions on 
suffrage and segregation are contrary to the framers' intent and constitute judicial 
legislation); P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 241-49 (1982) (contending that judicial 
review is not legitimated by social or political theory but by the legal system's theoret-
ical imperatives); J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PRO-
CESS 258-59 (1980) (advocating limiting Supreme Court review to individual rights 
cases); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 181-83 (1980) (recommending limiting judi-
cial review to the policymaking process as opposed to policy content); M. PERRY, THE 
CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 163-65 (1982) (supporting noninter-
pretive review as a protection of individual rights); Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living 
Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 699 (1976) (arguing that insufficiently limited judi-
cial review has been disastrous historically and does not comport with concepts of 
separation of powers ani! r~ .. ,.,n,.,.,.t;,. anu .. ,.,Tn .. nt) 
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system of mutual oversight, mutual checking, and combined 
interpretation. 6 
Agresta's structural approach does not deny judicial review. In-
stead, it sees judicial review as but one component of "interactive" 
constitutional interpretation. 
By considering judicial review in terms of our tripartite govern-
mental scheme, Agresto's work is characterized by its dual advo-
cacy of judicial review and checks on judicial power. On one hand, 
he sees judicial review as a necessary component of constitutional 
government, for it serves as a "restraint[ ] on the democratic 
will."7 On the other hand, he argues that "insofar as the Court has 
been a leader in the making and enforcement of societal rules, the 
concerns of those who decry the dangers of judicial imperialism 
can no longer be lightly dismissed."8 This dual advocacy, rather 
than placing him in an intractable position of self-contradiction, 
creates a dynamic that is vital to Agresto's theory of structural 
constitutional interpretation. By recognizing both the promise 
and the peril of judicial review, Agresto is not forced to choose 
between a limited and an active judiciary. Instead, he seeks a mid-
dle ground - a way to encourage both judicial activism and the 
coordinate review of judicial decisionmaking. 
There is surface appeal to Agresto's approach. Judicial review is 
neither foreclosed nor made supreme - two extremes that few 
people find satisfactory. But in advancing his theory of structural 
constitutional interpretation, Agresto fails to flesh out its neces-
sary components. Specifically, by not prescribing appropriate 
standards of conduct for the three branches, 9 Agresto makes the 
successful implementation of his proposal unlikely. 
Agresto confronts the issue of judicial review on distinctly prag-
matic grounds. Rather than striving to create an ideal (or better) 
society, Agresto's concerns are whether judicial review plays a 
necessary role in our governmental scheme and, if it does, how the 
elected branches should interact with an "activist" Court. 
Agresto concludes that judicial review is necessary because it 
serves two essential purposes. First, Agresto argues that judicial 
review ensures that government does not place the temporal pop-
ular will above the eternal Constitution.10 In other words, judicial 
6. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 10. 
7. Id. at 53. 
8. Id. at 163. 
9. For example, Agresto clearly indicates his displeasure with Court rulings on 
abortion, school prayer, and busing, id. at 11, 156-63, and his approval of President 
Abraham Lincoln's interpretation of the Dred Scott decision, id. at 90-94. 
10. See id. at 52-55. For Agresto, judicial review "[b]uild[s] on the Founder's de-
sire to overcome the dane:ers of maioritarian despotism or lee:islative tyranny (yet 
retain 'the spirit and ' 
review ensures that the popular will, as expressed in legislative 
and executive action, conforms to the Constitution. The elected 
branches, according to Agresto, cannot accomplish this purpose. 
Functioning within the limitations of democratic elections, 
Agresto feels that the actions of the president and Congress, at 
best, will reflect the popular will.11 
Second, Agresto contends that judicial review "contributes to 
the demands of a free society,"12 for it prevents the Constitution 
from becoming a stagnant, time-bound document. Towards this 
end, he speaks loftily of "[t]he Court's ... promise ... to help us 
apply and develop our fundamental principles and constitutional 
commands, its ability ... to help bring our philosophy to bear on 
our actions, to work out our present and our future in terms of our 
inheritance from the past."13 Agresto thus supports judicial re-
view, in part, because of the Court's "capacit[y] for dealing with 
matters of principle."l4 
Agresto, although a proponent of judicial review, differs sub-
stantially from contemporary scholars who contend that the judi-
ciary is the branch most capable of advancing American values15 
and the interests of the underrepresented.16 Unlike these think-
ers, Agresto argues that "the desire to live by stated principle 
means that no branch, not even the Court, can reform or shape 
those values freely or at will."17 Claiming that our system of 
checks and balances is a response to fears over the possible cen-
tralization of power in any branch of government, Agresto argues 
that "[p]ower checked mean[s] liberty supported."18 He thus 
11. See id. at 52-53. 
12. Id. at 152. 
13. Id. at 156-57. 
14. ld. at 149 (quoting A. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 25 (1962)). 
Agresto further argues that "[a]t its peak the Court will be that part of American 
politics which more than any other struggles to work out the implications of our be-
liefs. More than any other branch the Court explains to us the living mute words of 
the Constitution .... " Id. at 146. 
15. SeeP. BOBBITT, supra note 5, at 94. 
16. See J. CHOPER, supra note 5, at 68; M. PERRY, supra note 5, at 152-54. 
17. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 55. In this way, Agresto's thinking resembles 
Thomas Jefferson's views regarding judicial review. According to Jefferson, "Our 
country has thought proper to distribute the powers of its Government among three 
equal and independent authorities, constituting each a check on one or both of the 
others, in all attempts to impair its Constitution." C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT 
IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 266 (1926) (quoting C. BEARD, ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF 
JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY 454-55 (1915) (quoting message by President Thomas Jef-
ferson to Congress (Dec. 8, 1801) [hereinafter Jefferson's message to Congress] (pas-
sage omitted from message before delivery))). This passage is remarkably similar to 
Agresto's argument in emphasizing both the independence of each branch and the 
interlocking nature of our system of checks and balances. Unlike Agresto, however, 
Jefferson also contended that each branch "within the line of its proper functions ... 
acts in the last resort and without appeal." Id. at 266 (quoting C. BEARD, supra at 454-
55 (quoting Jefferson's message to Congress)). In other words, as Agresto recognizes, 
Jefferson did not support an interactive constitutional dialogue between the branches; 
"[r]ather, he held that each branch must construe the Constitution for itself as it 
concerns its own functions." J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 80 (emphasis in original). 
18. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 142. Agresto's concern extends beyond simple 
reciprocal checks, for he contends that each branch has a responsibility to develop 
constitutional law throu"h innPnPnnPnt t>nnc:titntinn" 1 int.,,.,...,-.,t,tin~. See supra text 
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blends his recognition of the Court's special role "as the mediator 
of our principles"19 with his belief that constitutional government 
is furthered by the elected branches serving as a check on the 
courts and vice versa.20 
Agresta, to make concrete these fears of possible judicial cen-
tralization, claims that there presently is a need for the elected 
branches to stymie activist Court rulemaking. Pointing to 
Supreme Court decisions on school prayer, abortion, and busing, 
he posits that, unless checked, the judiciary is "exceedingly dan-
gerous ... in its ability to be the creator, the designer, of new 
social policy."21 Moreover, to demonstrate that judicial centraliza-
tion should be of concern to both liberals and conservatives, he 
notes that, prior to Brown v. Board of Education, 22 judicial action 
frequently limited human and civil rights.2s 
With respect to an understanding of when and to what extent 
the elected branches should check Court decisions, Agresta pro-
vides little guidance.24 In fact, all that Agresta makes clear is that 
he supports Abraham Lincoln's approach toward the finality of 
judicial decisionmaking.25 Lincoln, in response to the Supreme 
Court's recognition in the Dred Scott case of the right of whites to 
own black slaves, 26 argued that Court decisions bind only the par-
ties to the suit.27 Under this vision, the impact of the Court's deci-
sions are limited, and the elected branches remain free to shape 
future political action. Indeed, as Agresta posits, the elected 
accompanying note 6; infra notes 24-28 and accompanying text. Critics of Agresta fail 
to understand this distinction. Professor Ronald Kahn, for example, claims that 
Agresta's "[simplistic belief] that an expanded congressional checking power [i.e., re-
ciprocal checks] will reinvigorate the doctrine of separation of powers" makes his the-
ory unworkable. Kahn, Process and Rights Principles in Modem Constitutional 
Theory (Book Review), 36 STAN. L. REv. 253, 256 (1984) (reviewing J. AGRESTO, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984)). 
19. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 55. 
20. Id. at 119. 
21. Id. at 11. 
22. 349 u.s. 294 (1955). 
23. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 154. 
24. Because of his support of active judicial review, Agresta makes clear his dis-
satisfaction with court-curbing measures bandied about in recent years. Impeach-
ment is considered too severe and politically impossible; limitations on federal courts' 
subject-matter jurisdiction are also viewed as too severe, because such legislation 
would deny judicial review. Id. at 119-20. Agresta also rejects judicial self-restraint 
because, if rigorously applied, it would "seriously mininllze[ ]" the judiciary's ability 
"to contribute to the healthy governance of the nation." Id. at 113. Finally, although 
recognizing that such procedural devices as the establishment of narrower require-
ments for class action suits ''have substantial merit," Agresta is "not yet certain that 
we should want a Court ... prevented from 'pondering abstract principles.' " Id. at 
133-34 (quoting McDowell, A Modest Remedy for Judicial Activism, 61 PuB. INTEREST 
3, 6 (1982)). 
25. Id. at 87-95. 
26. Dred Scott v. Sandford. 60 U.S. 393. 411-12 (1856). 
27. See J. AGRESTO, s: 
H  
branches have an obligation to check such improper judicial action 
by acting on their independent constitutional interpretations.28 
Agresta, however, never specifies the manner in which the 
elected branches can determine the propriety of a Court decision 
or how the elected branches should respond to an improper deci-
sion. Apparently, Agresta's sole concern is that the elected 
branches do act, not how they act. 
IL Analysis 
Agresta clearly hopes that the elected branches become actively 
involved in constitutional interpretation. He views constitutional 
government "as an interlocking system of mutual oversight, mu-
tual checking, and combined interpretation."29 Pointing to the 
"manifest errors of judicial legislation," he argues that "[w]e must, 
of course, go further than to signal our concern over particular 
acts of modern judicial policy,"30 and he views as exemplary 
Lincoln's response to Dred Scott.31 Moreover, while Agresta 
acknowledges that "this book cannot hope to prod Congress to 
act,"32 he hopes that his book will result in a greater "recognition 
that the Court's interpretations of the Constitution need not be 
immediately accepted as binding 'rules of political action.' "33 
To merely encourage legislative and executive responses to judi-
cial action, as Agresta does, serves only the narrow purpose of lim-
iting the authority of the courts. Agresta claims that this is not his 
aim; he considers judicial review an essential component of consti-
tutional government.34 Yet, without suggesting standards to gov-
ern the appropriate responses of the elected branches to judicial 
action, Congress and the executive might act, or fail to act, in a 
counterproductive manner. At one extreme, the elected branches 
may respond too weakly to inappropriate judicial action. For ex-
ample, had Congress accepted the Court's invalidation of child la-
bor laws in 1918, many more lives would have been ruined in the 
factories. At the other extreme, the elected branches may re-
spond too strongly to appropriate judicial action. For example, 
had Congress sought to undercut Brown v. Board of Education by 
28. Id. at 94 (stating that "the Lincolnian position does begin with the notion that 
all parts of the political process - the democratic branches as well as the courts -
have a legitimate hand in shaping the meaning of the constitutional text"). 
29. Id. at 10. 
30. Id. at 162. 
31. See supra note 9. 
32. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 137. 
33. Id. 
34. See supra notes 10-14 & 24 and accompanying text. Professor Lino Graglia 
misconstrues Agresto's criticism of activist Court rulings on abortion, school prayer, 
and school desegregation. In Graglia's view, to oppose such activist rulings is to op-
pose activist judicial review. Graglia thus concludes that Agresto "defeats his purpose 
[of limiting judicial review] entirely by embracing" an aspirational approach towards 
constitutional interpretation. Graglia, Constitutional Mysticism: The Aspirational 
Defense of Judicial Review CBook Review), 98 HARv. L. REV. 1331, 1331 (1985) (re-
viewing J. AGRESTO, THE · (1984)). 
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limiting federal court power in desegregation cases, 35 many black 
and white children would have been denied the opportunity to 
learn with each other. 
The risk of such improper elected branch action is substantial. 
Executive and congressional action plainly suggests that those 
branches cannot be trusted to distinguish proper from improper 
judicial action and to act in turn. With reference to Congress, 
Abner Mikva, former congressman and now D.C. circuit judge, re-
cently commented that "[f]or the most part, legislative debate does 
not explore the constitutional implications of pending legislation; 
and, at best, Congress does an uneven job of considering the con-
stitutionality of the statutes it adopts."36 Although there is reason 
to believe, as Dr. Louis Fisher aptly remarks, that "[m]embers of 
Congress have both the authority and the capability to participate 
constructively in constitutional interpretation,"37 Congress, at 
best, acts cautiously on constitutional matters -thus making it an 
unlikely participant in an active constitutional dialogue with the 
other branches. 
Executive constitutional interpretation is subject to similar crit-
icism. The Reagan administration, for example, has advocated 
that the judiciary pay greater attention to values of justiciability in 
constitutional decisionmaking.38 Policy preference and political 
expediency, however, have made the administration's support of 
these values merely rhetorical.39 For example, in the Supreme 
35. The constitutionality of such congressional action is subject to question. Com-
pare Rice, Limiting Federal Court Jurisdiction: The Constitutional Basis for the Pro-
posals in Congress Today, 65 JUDICATURE 190, 197 (1981) (approving proposed 
legislation to limit federal court authority) with Sager, The Supreme Court, 1980 Term 
-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress's Authority to Regulate the Ju-
risdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HAR.v. L. REV.17, 70 (1981) (stating that Congress 
should not have authority to deprive federal courts of jurisdiction over constitutional 
claims). 
36. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 
N.C.L. REV. 587, 587 (1983). Also recognizing Congress's limitations is Professor 
Owen Fiss, who commented, "Legislatures ... are not ideologically committed or in-
stitutionally suited to search for the meaning of constitutional values, but instead see 
their primary function in terms of registering the actual, occurrent preferences of the 
people .... " Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term- Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 
93 HARv. L. REv. 1, 10 (1980). 
37. Fisher, supra note 2, at 747. For Dr. Fisher, "[m]uch of constitutional law 
depends on fact-finding and the balancing of competing values, areas in which Con-
gress justifiably can claim substantial expertise." I d. Moreover, as Senator Harrison 
Schmitt argues, "[C]ourts may lack the institutional capacity to review all aspects of 
legislative decisions, such as the subjective motivations of the lawmakers. Here, if the 
Constitution is to be applied at all, it must be applied by ourselves as lawmakers." 128 
CONG. REC. 5091 (1982) (statement of Sen. Schmitt). 
38. See, e.g., Smith, Urging Judicial Restraint, 68 A.B.A. J. 59, 60 (1982) (stating 
that the Reagan administration will admonish courts "to observe strictly the require-
ments of justiciability"). 
39. See Devins, Who~ toBlameforJudicialActivism?, Wall St. J., Apr.17, 1984, 
at 34, col. 3. 
Court's 1983-84 term, the administration proferred inconsistent 
views of Article III standing requirements. In Heckler v. Mathews, 
the administration conceded that a male plaintiff could challenge 
a sex-based governmental classification solely because he was a 
male;40 but in Allen v. Wright, it claimed that parents of black 
school children could not challenge governmental compliance 
with antidiscrimination laws solely because they were black.41 
The inability of the tug and pull of the three branches to invari-
ably result in "appropriate" constitutional interpretation is exem-
plified by the recent controversy concerning the tax-exempt 
status of racially discriminatory private schools.42 In May 1983, 
the Supreme Court, in Bob Jones University v. United States, 43 
upheld an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) ruling44 that denied tax 
exemptions to private schools that practice racial discrimination.45 
In order for the Court to resolve this issue, however, all three 
branches of government ignored their designated roles in our con-
stitutional scheme. 
Congress, well aware of the tax-exemption controversy for 
more than fifteen years, has yet to enact clear legislation on this 
matter. Instead, it has permitted a jerry-built regulatory scheme 
to originate primarily from court rulemaking. The closest Con-
gress has come to acting on this matter was during the Carter ad-
ministration when it prohibited the IRS from implementing its 
1978 proposal46 that tax-exempt private schools satisfy quota-like, 
nondiscrimination enforcement standards.47 Congress did not 
respond, however, to President Reagan's January 1982 announce-
ment4s that he would support tax-exempt status to racially dis-
criminatory schools. In fact, our legislators could not even muster 
enough support to approve a proposed concurrent resolution op-
posing the administration's position.49 Congress thus has never 
given any real guidance to the other branches of government in 
40. Brief for Appellant at 48, Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728 (1984) (No. 82-
1050). 
41. Brief for Federal Petitioners at 24, Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984) (No. 
81-757). 
42. See McCoy & Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Challenges of Tax Exemp-
tions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 462-65 (1984). 
43. 468 F. Supp. 890 (D.S.C. 1978), rev'd, 639 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 461 
u.s. 574 (1983). 
44. Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230. 
45. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 605. 
46. Proposed Revenue Procedures on Private Tax-exempt Schools, 44 Fed. Reg. 
9451 (1979) (proposed Feb. 13, 1979); 43 Fed. Reg. 37,296 (1978) (proposed Aug. 22, 
1978). 
47. Congress delayed implementation of the proposed IRS procedure by denying 
appropriations for the procedure's formulation or enforcement. Treasury, Postal Ser-
vice, and General Government Appropriations Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-74, §§ 103, 
614-615, 93 Stat. 559, 562 (1979) (current version codified at 26 U.S.C. §§ 170, 501 
(1982)). 
48. Statement on Tax Exemptions for Private, Nonprofit Educational Institu-
tions, 1 PuB. PAPERS 17 (Jan. 12, 1982). 
49. See S. Con. Res. 59, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 128 CONG. REC. 363 (1982). Ironically, 
the basis of the Reagan policy was the administration's preference that Congress en-
act specific legislation ' r organiza-
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interpreting or implementing its intent on the tax-exemption 
issue. 
The president neglected his rulemaking responsibility on this 
matter in a quite different fashion. Immediately after announcing 
its decision to grant tax-exempt status to racially discriminatory 
schools, the Reagan administration filed a motion to dismiss the 
Bob Jones University lawsuit, claiming that it was moot.50 After 
the administration suffered severe criticism and political embar-
rassment for this policy decision, the Justice Department asked 
the Supreme Court to hear the Bob Jones suit.s1 The Reagan 
administration, however, was unwilling to reverse its January 
1982 decision to grant tax-exempt status.52 Consequently, the De-
partment was forced to ask the Court to appoint "counsel adver-
sary" to Bob Jones University on the case's underlying issue so 
that the case would satisfy the threshold constitutional require-
ment of adverseness.5 3 
Adverseness, however, also requires that the parties who bring 
a case to court should be the ones whose interests will be repre-
sented before the court.54 Thus the administration's request aban-
doned a fundamental requirement of federal judicial proceedings. 
Instead of abiding by the Constitution's inherent restrictions on 
federal court jurisdiction, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the 
case,55 thus transferring to the judiciary the apparent responsibil-
ity for a controversial political decision. Shortly after the 
Supreme Court appointed "counsel adversary" to Bob Jones Uni-
versity, Congress refused to ratify those limitations it had earlier 
placed on the Carter IRS, claiming that it was inappropriate for 
the legislature to act on this matter in light of the Supreme 
Court's forthcoming decision in Bob Jones University.56 
The tax-exemption debate, in which all three branches failed to 
assume their constitutionally designated responsibilities, high-
lights possible pitfalls of interbranch dialogue. Such pitfalls do 
not refute Agresto's thesis; he is concerned with how constitu-
tional interpretation should proceed, not with how it has failed in 
the past. But Agresto provides little guidance to those interested 
tions instead of having an administrative agency's decision govern the issue. See 
supra note 48, at 17. 
50. Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585 n.9. 
51. See id.; Administration Asks High Court to Settle School Exemption Issue, 
Wash. Post, Feb. 26, 1982, at A3, col. 4 [hereinafter School Exemption Issue]. 
52. Bob Jones Univ., 454 U.S. 892 (1981). 
53. See School Exemption Issue, supra note 51, at A3, col. 4. 
54. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975); McCoy & Devins, supra note 42, 
at 442 n.4. 
55. Bob Jones Univ., 454 U.S. 892 (1981). 
56. See 128 CONG. REC. 8622 (statement of Rep. Shannon); id. (statement of Rep. 
Panetta). 
in implementing his proposal. On one hand, Agresta encourages 
judicial activism because "the deliberate and often cumbersome 
arrangements of legislative institutions in America ... are some-
times too slow and often unable to remedy the denial of rights and 
privileges to certain individuals, groups, and classes."57 On the 
other hand, Agresta asks the question: "What checks can we de-
vise in order to superintend a judiciary with (it is claimed) final 
power over policies involving abortion, welfare, schools, police, 
racial balance, busing, [and] employment?"58 
How then do we distinguish reasonable from unreasonable judi-
cial conduct (or proper from improper elected branch responses to 
court decisions)? Agresta provides examples of what he considers 
appropriate elected branch responses to judicial action. 59 Yet, by 
not delineating his own values, Agresta leaves the implementation 
of structural constitutional interpretation to the myriad and oft-
conflicting views of his readers. As such, individuals who approve 
of the busing and abortion decisions and disapprove of decisions 
limiting, for example, court-ordered racial quotas in employ-
ment60 can line up behind Agresta. That Agresta clearly disagrees 
with these individuals, and that nothing in his book could be used 
to refute their position, points to the need for Agresta to recom-
mend criteria governing the implementation of his theory. 
Notwithstanding this limitation, Agresta's book is a valuable 
contribution to the current debate over the legitimacy and scope 
of judicial review. Agresta makes an effective case for checking 
the judiciary. By highlighting the Supreme Court's hostility 
towards legislatively enacted individual rights protections prior to 
Brown v. Board of Education, 61 Agresta demonstrates that great 
perils surround a judiciary willing to invalidate governmental pro-
grams.62 These "costs" of judicial review are substantial, pointing 
to the need for further exploration of how the elected branch 
might appropriately check judicial action. When viewed as a call 
for elected branch review of judicial decisionmaking, The Supreme 
Court and Constitutional Democracy does quite well. 
57. J. AGRESTO, supra note 1, at 162. 
58. Id. at 163. 
59. See supra note 9. 
60. See Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 580-82 (1984). 
61. See J. AGRES'T'n J:wrwn. nnt<> 1 .. t 97_"ln 
62. See id. at 31. 
